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Abstract With the disintegration of the USSR a conflict arose between Kyrgyzstan,
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan over the transboundary Syr Darya river. Upstream Kyrgyzstan
controls the Toktogul reservoir which generates hydropower demanded mainly in winter for
heating. Downstream Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan need irrigation water in summer, primarily
to grow an export crop (cotton). Regional agreements obliging Kyrgyzstan to higher sum-
mer discharges in exchange for fossil fuel transfers from downstream riparians in winter
have been unsuccessful, due to lack of trust between the parties. Striving for self-sufficiency
in irrigation water, Uzbekistan initiated new reservoir construction. This paper examines
their economic impact. We report a laboratory experiment modelling the Syr Darya scenario
as a multi-round, three-player trust game with non-binding contracts. Payoff schemes are
estimated using real-life data. While basinwide efficiency maximisation requires regional
cooperation, our results demonstrate that cooperation in the laboratory is hard to achieve.
Uzbek reservoirs improve cooperation only weakly and their positive impact is limited to
low-water years.
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1 Introduction
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 left the newly independent Central Asian Republics
with a difficult transition task and inter-state relations that have not always been easy. Almost
immediately a conflict arose over the use and allocation of the waters of the Syr Darya river
with major economic and political ramifications for the region. Upstream Kyrgyzstan oper-
ates the sizable Toktogul Reservoir to facilitate hydropower production while the downstream
riparians, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, divert water from the river to irrigate land dominated
by cotton cultivation.1 The conflict stems from the diametrically opposed seasonal require-
ments for water in the different countries. Kyrgyzstan has the highest demand for electricity
in the winter months thus generating an incentive to store summer inflows into the Toktogul
Reservoir for subsequent release during the winter. In contrast, the downstream countries
require water to be released during the summer months to irrigate their agricultural lands,
but have no use for the water in winter.
The different seasonal water requirements of the upstream and downstream republics have
long been problematic. During the Soviet period the decision on when and how much water
was to be released from the upstream reservoir was made by central planners in Moscow. For
years Kyrgyzstan was ordered to discharge water during the summer so that the cotton fields
of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan could be irrigated. In exchange the downstream countries
sent electric power, coal and gas to Kyrgyzstan during the winter months. With Moscow no
longer intervening in such matters the riparian states were forced to seek voluntary coopera-
tive agreements over water and energy. However, barter agreements that obliged Kyrgyzstan
to operate the reservoir in an irrigation mode, in exchange for coal and gas supplies from
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan during the winter months, were invariably breached by all three
parties. A fundamental lack of trust has been central to the failure of interstate agreements and
although a co-operative agreement could be beneficial for all three countries, it has proven
prohibitively hard to implement one in practice.
Frustrated by the history of failed agreements the downstream countries are increas-
ingly leaning towards a policy of self-sufficiency, making themselves less dependent on
Kyrgyzstan. To this end, Uzbekistan has pursued plans to construct new reservoirs on its
territory. The reservoirs will store upstream winter releases for irrigation use in summer. But
to what extent do these new reservoirs represent the long-awaited solution to the conflict?
Several issues need to be addressed to answer this question. First, the fact that the cooperation
record has been poor so far does not imply that this will be the case in the future. The 2005
revolution in Kyrgyzstan and the forthcoming retirement of senior government officials in all
the riparian states bring new players to the negotiation table.2 It is possible that new players
will act differently, making expensive reservoir construction obsolete. So the question arises
whether the previous failure to cooperate is systematic or idiosyncratic. In other words, has
cooperation failed because this is inherent to the problem, or because the decision makers in
charge have been incapable of working together? Secondly, the capacity of the new down-
1 Kazakhstan is located downstream to Uzbekistan.
2 Many of the most senior officials in the water sector are near or have passed the official age of retirement.
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stream reservoirs is limited. While they mitigate the costs of uncoordinated behaviour, they
do not eliminate the need for cooperation to maximise basinwide efficiency. If incentives to
cooperate get even worse, not much may be gained.
The aim of this paper is to address these questions. We designed a model that estimates
the economic impact of the new reservoirs on the riparian economies. In doing so we had to
tackle two difficulties. First, the model needs to trace the real economic situation as accurately
as possible, despite notoriously limited data availability. We collated data from a variety of
sources and from a series of interviews with experts on location—government officials and
representatives of development agencies—to make estimates as informed as possible. Sec-
ondly, costs and benefits from the new reservoirs crucially depend on the ability of decision
makers to cooperate, which is a behavioural issue. To examine this, we introduce a novel
approach to the analysis of transboundary river conflicts. We used a model estimated from
real data and designed a game that resembles the strategic environment in the Syr Darya
river conflict. Controlled laboratory experiments were then conducted to study the likelihood
of future cooperation. Building on a long tradition of experimental research the laboratory
appears to be an ideal testbed to study scenarios of cooperation and conflict in shared river
basins. We re-create an analogous, although stylised, set of conditions where we can ana-
lyse the strategic environment of the Syr Darya conflict in different future scenarios. In four
separate treatments, we simulate the economic scenario with and without the new Uzbek
reservoirs under three representative hydrological regimes.
We find that Uzbek reservoirs do not represent the solution to the river conflict. Maximisa-
tion of basinwide efficiency continues to require riparian cooperation. Though they alleviate
Uzbekistan’s problems in low-water years the reservoirs are not sufficiently large to achieve
Uzbek self-sufficiency in irrigation water. Moreover, the experimental results reveal that
cooperation is indeed very hard to establish in the present strategic environment, especially
in low-water years. Contracts are frequently broken—so frequently that they do not improve
efficiency over a control scenario without any agreements. Thus failure to cooperate should
not solely be attributed to the unwillingness or incapability of current decision makers, but,
as we argue, to the inherit coordination problem that the riparians are trying to solve. Finally,
we find that reservoirs improve the likelihood of cooperation only marginally.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Sect. 2 provides background infor-
mation on the river conflict and reviews relevant literature. Section 3 develops the model
and describes the experimental design. Section 4 presents the experimental results. Section 5
summarises and concludes.
2 Background3
Water resources are of critical importance to the Central Asian economies.4 Mountainous
Kyrgyzstan has a substantial hydropower potential covering up to 80% of its domestic energy
needs. Hydropower exports—through barter trade to other Central Asian countries and to
Russia in cash—account for approximately 10% of total exports. In Uzbekistan, irrigated
3 For further information see Economist Intelligence Unit (2004), International Monetary Fund (2008),
Linn et al. (2005), O’Hara (2000a, b), SPECA (2004), US Department of Agriculture (2004) and World
Bank (2004a, b, c, d, e).
4 With a GDP of US$3.5 bn. and a population of 5.2 m, Kyrgyzstan is one of the poorest countries in the
region. Uzbekistan is larger and slightly less poor. It has a GDP of US$22.3 bn. and a population of 26.9 m.
Kazakhstan is the most prosperous country in a poor region. Its GDP is US$103.8 bn. in a population of 15.5 m
(2007 data).
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Fig. 1 Map of the Syr Darya river. Note: Map not drawn to scale. Source: World Bank (2004a)
cotton production is the most important economic activity in an agriculturally dominated
economy. The country is the World’s second largest cotton exporter with a market share of
almost 10%. Cotton exports totalled US$1.1 billion in 2007, equivalent to 14% of total com-
modity exports. Finally, although the Syr Darya is of relatively low economic significance
to the oil-dominated Kazakh economy, it is nevertheless of substantial regional importance.
Cotton exports from South-Kazakhstan (one of the two provinces that the Syr Darya flows
through) equalled around 1% of total Kazakh exports in 2002.
The Syr Darya, one of Central Asia’s most important transboundary rivers, rises in the
mountains of Kyrgyzstan. It has two main tributaries, the Naryn and the Kara Darya which
merge in eastern Uzbekistan to form the Syr Darya proper. From there the river flows into
Tajikistan5 before re-entering Uzbekistan and finally flowing into Kazakhstan where it dis-
charges into the remnants of the Small Aral Sea (see Fig. 1).6 The flows of the Syr Darya
and its tributaries are regulated by a series of reservoirs built during the Soviet period. The
most important of these being the substantial, multi-purpose Toktogul Reservoir (14.5 billion
cubic meters, BCM) built in the 1970s on the Naryn River in Kyrgyzstan. The reservoir was
primary constructed to even out inter-annual variations in river flows thereby maximising its
irrigation potential. Toktogul is also used to produce hydropower.
Under Soviet administration Toktogul was operated under an irrigation regime whereby
75% of the annual discharge was released from the reservoir in the summer months
(April–September). Releases during the winter months (October–March) accounted for the
remaining 25%. Surplus hydropower, in excess of Kyrgyz demand, generated in the summer
was fed into the Central Asian Power System for use by the Uzbek and southern Kazakh
regions. Since the Kyrgyz region lacked any significant fossil fuel resources, they were trans-
5 Tajikistan plays only a minor, regulatory role on the Syr Darya due to its relatively low reservoir storage
capacity and insignificant irrigation withdrawal rates. For this reason Tajikistan is not treated explicitly in this
analysis.
6 The tragedy of the shrinking Aral Sea is a disastrous side effect of intensive irrigation. This issue is outside
the scope of our study.
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ferred from the Uzbek and Kazakh republics to enable the Kyrgyz region to meet its winter
demand for electricity and heat through thermal energy production.
After independence, the Soviet arrangement came under great strain. Fossil fuel prices
rose quickly to world price levels and payments were increasingly demanded in hard cur-
rency. Households in Kyrgyzstan switched from expensive fossil fuel fired heating to electric
heating, thus increasing winter electricity demand. Kyrgyzstan could not afford to import
fossil fuels to generate electricity and started to increase winter discharges of water from
Toktogul to meet its winter power demand and reduce summer releases to store water for the
following winter. As a result, farmers in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan faced irrigation water
shortages in summer. Furthermore, the frozen waterways and canals were unable to handle
the larger volume of water in winter, occasionally causing flooding on downstream territories.
In the absence of a central planner to solve this conflict, the newly independent republics
had to seek voluntary cooperative agreements. In February 1992 they signed the Almaty
Agreement agreeing to the joint ownership and management of the region’s water resources,
while retaining sovereign control over crops, industrial goods and electric power obtained
from them. The agreement further reiterated the need for cooperation. But this, as well as
annual agreements for the release of water and exchange of electricity and fossil fuels, proved
ineffective and could not arrest the increasing orientation towards power production of the
Toktogul operation. Eventually in March 1998, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan
entered into a Long Term Framework Agreement which explicitly recognised that annual
and multi-year irrigation water storage has a cost and that it needs to be compensated, either
through a barter exchange of electricity and fossil fuels or in cash. But, the supply of fossil
fuels generally fell short of agreed quantities and quality, forcing Kyrgyzstan to increase
winter discharges. In wet years downstream states did not need the agreed volumes of sum-
mer discharges and this affected the export of electricity and the compensating quantities of
fossil fuel transfers to Kyrgyzstan. The latter was thus exposed to a serious risk in meeting its
winter demand for heating and power. To reduce this risk, Kyrgyzstan, on average, reduced
summer releases to 45% of the annual discharges (and winter releases increased to 55%)
during the 1990s.
When matters failed to improve in the new millennium, the Uzbek position changed
towards a decisive unilateral stance. The most explicit expression hereof has been the deci-
sion to construct a series of re-regulating reservoirs. Uzbekistan proceeded with the design
of new water storage capacity of about 2.5 BCM. The impact of the Uzbek decision has
been substantial for Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. The Kyrgyz challenge is that even when
operated in the noncooperative ‘power mode’, production is insufficient to cover domestic
winter electricity demand. In the absence of a regional agreement, the Kyrgyz government
must aim to cover this deficit through a combination of domestic reforms and construction of
new power-generating facilities—both of which represent daunting challenges. Kazakhstan,
which had otherwise pursued a cooperative strategy towards Kyrgyzstan, has had to come
to terms with the fact that this strategy ultimately depended on Uzbek willingness to coop-
erate. Since the latter was not forthcoming, Kazakhstan has also shown renewed interest in
the construction of re-regulating reservoirs on its own territory. Plans exist for constructing
a 3 BCM Kazakh reservoir, although no final political decision has been made to initiate
construction.7
The central problem for the interstate agreements has been one of trust. Short of military
action there are no means to enforce a contract between sovereign republics who are gener-
ally suspicious of each other. If Kyrgyzstan discharges additional water in summer, it must
7 Personal communication with Leonid Dmitriev, Kazgiprovodhoz, Almaty (15 December 2004).
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trust the downstream riparians to deliver fossil fuels in winter, otherwise it will face a severe
problem of not being able to meet its winter energy demand. Hence, it must incur a temporary
economic loss and would rely on compensation from the downstream neighbours—without
being able to enforce the reward. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, on the other hand, are less
inclined to send fossil fuels to Kyrgyzstan if they fear that the latter will deviate from the
agreement by releasing large volumes of water in winter. The Syr Darya conflict therefore
has the nature of a trust game, reminiscent of those that have been extensively studied in the
experimental economics literature (e.g. Fehr et al. 1993; Berg et al. 1995; Dufwenberg and
Gneezy 2000; Fershtman and Gneezy 2001; Gächter and Falk 2002; Cox et al. 2008).8 In
trust (or reciprocity) games a first mover can send money to a second mover, who in turn can
voluntarily reward the trustor by sending money back. The games are constructed such that
by doing so, both players can be better off with respect to final payoffs, but in equilibrium
no trust and no rewarding would be exhibited. Contrary to the theoretical prediction, the
common finding of these studies is that first movers often show trust by passing money, and
second movers often reward them by sending money back, even if the game is played only
once and under completely anonymous conditions. In light of these findings the poor record
of cooperation in the Central Asian river conflict looks surprising. However, the games in the
literature use artificial payoff structures which differ from those underlying the Syr Darya
river game, and involve only two players.
The economic literature on transboundary river sharing includes inter alia contributions
by Barrett (1994), Dinar and Wolf (1994), Moller (2004), Rogers (1997), Kilgour and Dinar
(2001) and Ambec and Sprumont (2002). These, mainly theoretical, contributions are preoc-
cupied with how and under what circumstances riparians can attain cooperative outcomes in
conflicts over water quantity sharing, but they do not address inter-temporal conflicts arising
over upstream hydropower and downstream irrigation use. Most of the economic literature
that does address this type of conflict typically deals with inter-state rivers, especially in the
United States, rather than rivers crossing international borders. Particularly pertinent are the
studies of the Snake-Columbia river by McCarl and Ross (1985), Houston and Whittlesey
(1986), McCarl and Parandvash (1988), and Hamilton et al. (1989). The Colorado river has
been analysed by Gisser et al. (1979) and the irrigation districts in Central California by
Chatterjee et al. (1998). The study by Owen-Thomsen et al. (1982) of Egypt’s High Aswan
Dam represents an exception to the focus on US-based rivers. These studies use mathematical
programming to analyse the impacts on the agricultural sector of a water transfer to hydro-
power production because the latter often has the highest marginal productivity. Authors such
as Hamilton et al. (1989) consider the possible role of market mechanisms to improve the
resource allocation. Others, such as Chatterjee et al. (1998), have emphasised the establish-
ment of clearer property rights. Both of these policy remedies, however, are less suitable in
an international context. International trade in water is rare, partly because the conflicting
principles of international law complicate the property rights issue.
There are just three economic studies of an international hydropower-irrigation conflict.
Aytemiz (2001) examines the conflict between Turkey and Syria on the Euphrates. Moller
(2005a, b) develops a theoretical model of the Syr Darya conflict. He takes a noncooperative
approach by examining the conflict-reducing impact of a range of infrastructure projects. Con-
struction of downstream reservoirs is found to reduce conflict through a Pareto-improvement,
but it does not lead attainment of basinwide efficiency (Pareto-optimality). World Bank
(2004a) takes a cooperative approach to the Syr Darya conflict by examining how side pay-
8 Irlenbusch (2005a, b) reports results from a slightly more complex game, but with the non-binding contracts
that characterise the real game.
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ments can be used to attain efficient outcomes. It demonstrates that net Syr Darya basin
benefits are substantially higher when the Toktogul reservoir is operated in an ‘irrigation
mode’ than under the ‘power mode’. Developed before the collapse of the barter agree-
ments, the report recommends a number of ways in which the existing regional cooperation
mechanisms could be improved. These include inter alia proposals to use multi-year rather
than annual agreements, a ‘letter of credit scheme’ and the introduction of a monitoring and
guarantee mechanism to ensure compliance with agreed obligations. Riparian governments
are yet to implement any of these proposals (see World Bank 2004b for details).
Building on the work contained in World Bank (2004a) our paper also explores the scope
for cooperation in the Syr Darya conflict. Using similar assumptions about key economic
variables we develop a more general economic model which is then used for laboratory
experiments.9 There are three major differences between our model and that in World Bank
(2004a). The first relates to different assumptions about water availability. We assume an
average annual water outflow of around 13 BCM compared to 9 BCM used in the World
Bank report. The latter figure has been discredited (as World Bank 2004b concedes) because
it is based on a non-homogenous data set for the 1911–2000 period compiled by BVO Syr
Darya (a basinwide agency located in Tashkent) which under-records inflow since 1975.
Secondly, the Bank report compares two different water allocations (irrigation and power
mode) while we generalise the analysis by considering a continuum of allocations within
the historically relevant range. Thirdly, and as a consequence, we have introduced several
capacity constraints to provide a realistic treatment of extreme scenarios. The subsequent
section develops the model and details the design of the experiment.
3 The Model and Experimental Design
Before formulating the economic model we had to make some choices. First, since Uzbek
reservoirs are at an advanced stage of construction we decided mainly to focus on these in
the experiment, and not to include the Kazakh reservoirs because the government has not yet
approved their construction. Further, we neglect the impact of winter flooding, though this
is a much-discussed concern of the Uzbek and Kazakh governments. Reliable estimates of
the damages of flooding proved impossible to obtain, but there are some indications that the
economic costs of flooding are relatively small. The most substantial damage seems to be
political, since flooding is a very visible event likely to stir public anger.
3.1 The Stage Game
We first turn our attention to the strategic environment. The Syr Darya river conflict is charac-
terised by negotiations between governments of the three countries and the problem of their
subsequent implementation. Consequently, we design a game that consists of two stages.
First, in a negotiation stage the three players—each representing a country—are given the
opportunity to make a contract on a combination of water releases and possible side pay-
ments. This contract, however, is non-binding, as there is no way in which a country can be
forced to obey (leaving aside the unlikely possibility of military intervention). In the second
9 Experiments on games informed by real-world data are surprisingly rare. Some have been carried out in the
course of consulting projects for spectrum auctions, but their results are often not published due to confiden-
tiality concerns of the clients (an exception is Abbink et al. 2002). In a different context, Güth et al. (2008)
parameterise a bargaining game with data from a case study on the film industry. Abbink et al. (2008) use data
from Zambian maize markets to inform an oligopoly experiment.
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stage of the game the players decide on the water releases and side payments they actually
implement.
In the real conflict negotiations take place annually in trilateral negotiations. In the exper-
imental design we attempt to model such a scenario. However, to make it playable in the
laboratory we need to impose a certain structure on the negotiations, which takes into account
that laboratory time is limited. At the first stage of the game, therefore, one player makes a
proposal to the other two players. We chose to draw the proposer at random in each round of
the game (each with a probability of one third), in the absence of a natural candidate. After
the proposal is specified, its terms are communicated to the other two players. These players
are then simultaneously asked to accept or reject it. Since the contract is non-binding, the
negotiation part of the game is merely ‘cheap talk’ in the game theoretic sense. It may be
used to co-ordinate the players’ behaviour, but it cannot be enforced and does not restrict the
players in their subsequent actions. A proposal consists of four elements: (1) The amount
of water that Kyrgyzstan releases to Uzbekistan from Toktogul in summer. (2) The amount
of water that Uzbekistan passes on to Kazakhstan. (3) A compensation payment that Uzbe-
kistan makes to Kyrgyzstan, and; (4) a compensation payment that Kazakhstan makes to
Uzbekistan.
After the proposal has been either accepted or rejected, the players make the decisions for
real in stage two of the game. As the first mover Kyrgyzstan decides on a release of water
from Toktogul. At the next stage Uzbekistan makes two decisions at once. It chooses which
quantity of water to release to Kazakhstan, and an amount of money to pay to Kyrgyzstan. As
the final step of the stage game, Kazakhstan decides on a side payment to make to Uzbekistan.
At all stages are the players informed about all players’ decisions at preceding stages.
The natural inflow into the Kyrgyz reservoir, Toktogul, is exogenously given and known.
Uzbekistan can release to Kazakhstan any quantity of water up to what it receives from
Kyrgyzstan. The compensation payments are amounts of money. This represents a simplifi-
cation of conduct of play in the real conflict, where Uzbekistan refuses to make any monetary
payments in exchange for water or to attach a price on water (services)—a demand from the
Kyrgyz side. In practice, however, Uzbekistan has implicitly agreed to pay compensations
through an inflated price for the electricity it receives from Kyrgyzstan in summer. Simplic-
ity is important for the experiment and we therefore decided not to model these additional
behavioural complexities.
3.2 Costs, Benefits, and Payoff Functions
For the payoffs associated with the discharge of water we estimate a model from the available
data, following World Bank (2004a). The payoff functions of the three riparians and their esti-
mations are described in detail in Appendix A. Kyrgyz payoff depends positively on the net
energy balance and side payments received from Uzbekistan. The exogenous energy demand
of Kyrgyzstan can be met through hydropower or thermal power production. Uzbekistan’s
payoff is a positive function of cotton production, hydropower imports from Kyrgyzstan
and the net side payments received (what it receives from Kazakhstan less what it pays to
Kyrgyzstan). Kazakh payoffs are similar to those of Uzbekistan, depending positively on
cotton production, energy imports, but negatively in its own side payment to Uzbekistan.
The marginal productivity of water turns out to be highest in downstream cotton pro-
duction within the relevant ranges, given the estimated parameters of the model. Basinwide
efficiency (or total payoff) can therefore be enhanced through higher Kyrgyz summer dis-
charges relative to its noncooperative choice. The model can usefully be expressed as the
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Fig. 2 Marginal costs (MC) and marginal benefits (MB), Q = 13
cost incurred by Kyrgyzstan from discharging additional water and the associated benefits
arising to downstream countries. Costs and benefits are a function of the total water inflow
to the Toktogul reservoir, Q, and Kyrgyzstan’s discharge of water in the summer, qsky.10
To illustrate the properties of the model we use a normal water year (Q = 13 BCM) as a
benchmark and show marginal costs and benefits as a function of Kyrgyz summer discharge
(see Fig. 2).11
Marginal costs and benefits are constant, piecewise linear and each schedule has five steps.
Consider first each of these steps on the marginal benefit curve starting from left: (1) For
low Kyrgyz water discharges, downstream marginal benefits are limited to cotton irrigation
only. (2) Marginal benefits increase for higher discharges as this generates a Kyrgyz energy
surplus in the summer period and results in cost savings for energy importing downstream
countries. (3) Marginal benefits then fall slightly as Kazakh irrigation demands are satu-
rated. (4) They fall further as a capacity constraint of electricity exports becomes binding. (5)
Marginal benefits eventually reach zero as Uzbekistan receives sufficient irrigation water.
Marginal costs (of Kyrgyzstan) are determined by summer as well as winter effects. Low
summer releases are associated with a domestic Kyrgyz energy deficit in summer (and a
surplus in winter) while the reverse is the case for high discharges. The five steps on the
marginal cost curve are characterised as follows: (1) For low water discharge values in the
summer period, Kyrgyzstan have to operate both of its thermal power plants (Bishkek I and
II) as insufficient hydropower will be generated relative to energy demand. Each additional
water unit released produces relatively more hydropower and reduces the marginal need
for thermal power generation, and marginal costs are therefore negative (i.e. Kyrgyzstan
incurs a marginal benefit). (2) As summer discharges increase, the marginal cost savings of
hydropower production fall as it substitutes only for the relatively cheaper Bishkek I plant
(Bishkek II is no longer needed to satisfy the Kyrgyz energy demand). As a result marginal
costs increase, but remain negative. (3) Marginal costs equal zero when the primary energy
balance of Kyrgyzstan is non-negative in both seasons and the country relies exclusively
on hydropower. (4) For higher discharges marginal costs (of operating Bishkek I) become
10 Winter discharge from Kyrgyzstan is determined residually as Q − qsky. See Appendix A for a discussion
of this assumption.
11 In this subsection, we further assume, for illustrative purposes, that water is shared equally between the
two downstream riparians. This assumption does not affect the properties of the model in any significant
way. It merely affects the size of total benefits and the distribution of those benefits between Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan. Equal water sharing produces conservative benefit estimates because the potential for downstream
optimisation is not necessarily exploited.
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Table 1 Model results for alternative values of the two treatment variables
Q 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Noncooperative equilibrium (qsky) 3.3 3.3–4.2 3.3–5.2 3.3–6.2 3.3–7.2 3.3–8.2 3.3–9.2
Cooperative optimum (qsky) 4.2 5.2 6.2 7.2 7.9 8.3 9.0a
Basinwide gains from Uzbek reservoirs (million US$)
Noncooperativeb 8.8 8.7 8.8 8.8 6.3 2.8 0.0
Cooperative 8.8 8.7 8.7 6.3 3.9 2.4 0.0
Basinwide gains of cooperation (million US$)b
Without reservoirs 9.5 9.0 9.0 9.0 6.4 0.0 0.0
With reservoirs 9.5 9.0 8.9 6.5 4.0 0.0 0.0
a qsky = 9.0 without reservoirs but is given by the interval [7.9;9.2] with reservoirs
b Refers to the highest noncooperative water release
positive since a high summer release causes an energy deficit in winter as there is insufficient
water to produce hydropower. (5) Marginal costs peak when the more expensive Bishkek
II also needs to be operated in winter. Finally, we note that net benefits of cooperation are
maximised at the intersection between the marginal cost and marginal benefit schedules,
corresponding to running Toktogul in ‘irrigation mode’
Table 1 illustrates the model results more generally allowing for variation in water inflow
(Q) to Toktogul and the possibility of Uzbek reservoirs. Outcomes are highly sensitive to
overall water availability within the historically relevant interval of 10 and 16 BCM per year.
The noncooperative equilibrium, determined by the Kyrgyz pay-off maximization choice, is
non-unique. A summer discharge of 3.3 BCM is sufficient to eliminate the domestic energy
deficit in summer. The end interval of the equilibrium is increasing in Q and is determined
by the point where Kyrgyzstan incurs a domestic energy deficit in winter. The cooperative
optimum, which maximizes the basinwide payoff is typically unique and increasing in Q
because higher overall water availability reduces the Kyrgyz marginal costs in winter and
shifts the right-hand part of the marginal cost schedule downwards. Cooperation typically
involves a higher Kyrgyz summer discharge than noncooperation, except in high-water years
where the two may be identical. Table 1 also illustrates the intuitive property that basinwide
gains from cooperation are highest when water is scarce.12
The economic impact of the new Uzbek reservoirs are summarized as follows. Uzbek cot-
ton benefits, and thus total basinwide benefits increase by up to US$8.8 million depending on
Q. By and large, the basinwide gain from Uzbek reservoirs is decreasing in Q, i.e. reservoirs
are most useful in low-water years. Uzbek reservoirs may also make cooperation slightly
less attractive as basinwide gains of cooperation fall slightly. Maximisation of basinwide
efficiency requires regional cooperation (with or without reservoirs), except when water is
abundant. In this sense reservoirs do not establish Uzbek self-sufficiency in irrigation water,
i.e. Uzbekistan can increase its benefits even further by cooperating with the other riparians.
For a normal water year we compute a cooperative surplus equal to US$9.0 million per year.
12 Note that the value of basinwide gains depend on the selection of the non-unique, noncooperative equilib-
rium. Table 1 produces conservative estimates because we assume that the equilibrium with the highest release
is selected. This is also the least inefficient one. Equilibria with lower releases do not benefit Kyrgyzstan but
harm the downstream countries.
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3.3 The Conduct of the Experiment
Since the payoff functions developed from the available real-world data are complex, they
needed to be presented in the simplest possible way for the experiment. We used tables
that list the payoffs obtained by each combination of water releases from Kyrgyzstan to
Uzbekistan and from Uzbekistan to Kazakhstan. Depending on the range of feasible releases
these payoff tables could quickly become very large and incomprehensible. Therefore, the
number of choices was restricted. Water discharges were limited to integer numbers. We fur-
ther cut the strategy space in a way that Kyrgyzstan could only pass any integer number from 3
to 9. Releases outside this range are historically irrelevant and were not plausible choices. The
resulting payoff tables consisted of 49 lines and four columns. The first three columns showed
the payoffs for each of the three players, the last column the sum of the three payoffs (enabling
participants to identify efficient outcomes). The payoff tables can be found in Appendix B.
For the specification of the payoff values from the payoff functions we had to make
some choices. First, we adopted the principle that ‘a dollar is a dollar’, thus we did not
account for a different marginal utility of money in the three countries. Those could arise
from their different population sizes or GDP levels. Such corrections, however, would have
been somewhat arbitrary (for example, in Kazakhstan water benefits apply to the South
Kazakhstan and Qyzlorda provinces only). Further, such considerations do not seem to play
a significant role in the actual policy debate. Secondly, in the theoretical model payoffs are
formulated in additional costs of water release for Kyrgyzstan and additional benefits for the
downstream riparians. In the experiments absolute payoffs needed to be implemented, thus
the unspecified intercepts of the payoff functions had to be defined. We decided to choose
the intercepts in a way which was most suitable experimentally, rather than derive them
from some real-world benchmark (such as GDP). This way we could make sure that equal
payoffs for the three players—a natural focal point in experiments—could be implemented
in cooperative scenarios (thus cooperation was not impeded by incompatibility with possible
equality considerations). Further, we had to make sure that different strategy choices could
lead to substantially different payoffs in order to properly incentivise the participants. As a
benchmark we chose the least inefficient noncooperative equilibrium outcome without res-
ervoirs in the normal water year (Q = 13), where Kyrgyzstan discharges 6 units (BCM) and
Uzbekistan releases 1 unit, since this is currently the most relevant scenario in reality. Payoffs
were adjusted in a way that each player gets 370 talers (the experimental currency unit) in
this scenario. From there we calculated all other payoffs using the cost and benefit functions
derived earlier. Each taler difference between two numbers in the payoff tables corresponds to
US$ 100,000 per year in the real game. Note that side payments would be added or subtracted
from these figures, such that a wide range of payoff combinations was achievable.
The experiment was conducted at the Centre for Decision Research and Experimen-
tal Economics (CeDEx) of the University of Nottingham. The software for the experiment
was developed using the RatImage programming package (Abbink and Sadrieh 1995). Sub-
jects were recruited by e-mail from a database of students, who had previously registered at
CeDEx as potential participants in experiments. Each subject participated in only one session,
and no subject had participated in experiments similar to the present one. The subjects were
undergraduate students from a wide range of disciplines. The majority of participants were
British. Among the substantial fraction of foreign students the largest group was Chinese.
Virtually all subjects were aged between 19 and 25, with a balanced gender distribution.13
13 Ideally we would have wished to conduct the experiment with participants from a Central Asian cultural
background. However, few students from that region are enrolled at the University of Nottingham, and in
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In each session subjects interacted in fixed groups of three subjects. The role of a partic-
ipant as representing Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan did not change throughout the
experiment. This set-up reflects the repeated-game character of the real situation. Subjects
were not told which of the other participants were in the same group, but they knew that
the composition of the groups did not change. Each session began with an introductory talk.
The experimenter read aloud the written instructions (see Appendix C). The language used
in the instructions was semi-natural. The situation was framed as that of a ‘resource being
passed’ from one player to the other, but we did not label the players as the three countries
they represented. Since we did not expect many students to be familiar with the Syr Darya
river conflict, we were concerned that an entirely natural framing would cause confusion.
On the other hand we did not expect a benefit from completely disguising the situation using
abstract terms as this would have made the instructions more difficult to understand.
We conducted 24 rounds of the stage game.14 These were divided into three phases of
eight rounds, using the different inflow levels, Q, of 10, 13, and 16 to represent low, normal
and high water levels, respectively. The order of the three phases was varied in a way that each
water level was played in each of the phases in the same number of sessions. The different
levels of inflow implied different payoff distributions, but otherwise the structure of the game
remained the same in each phase.
Subjects were granted a capital balance of 1,000 talers at the outset of each session. The
total earnings of a subject from participating in the experiment were equal to the capital
balance plus the sum of all the payoffs he or she made during the experiment minus the
sum of that subject’s losses. A session lasted for about two hours (including time spent to
read the instructions). At the end of the experiment, subjects were paid their total earnings
anonymously in cash, at a conversion rate of one pound sterling for 400 talers. Subjects
earned between £3.44 and £39.10 with an average of £21.95, which is considerably more
than students’ regular wage in Nottingham. At the time of the experiment, the exchange rate
to other major currencies was approximately US$1.90 and e1.45 for £1.
We conducted three sessions with four treatments. In the treatments we varied two dimen-
sions. First, we ran sessions modelling the scenarios with and without Uzbek reservoirs. The
treatments differed in the payoff tables, but not in the structure of the game. Second, we ran
both scenarios with and without non-binding contracts or agreements. The latter treatment
was motivated by the observation that contracts are frequently broken in the real conflict.
Although contracts are cheap talk in a game theoretic sense, we wanted to examine whether
their presence helped players to cooperate during the experiment.
Each session comprised of 12, 15, or 18 subjects, where the variation is due to show-
up rates. Subjects interacted with each other within groups but not across groups so that
each group of three countries can be considered a statistically independent observation. With
contracts, we gathered 15 independent observations in the treatment without reservoirs and
Footnote 13 continued
Central Asia we did not have access to a computerised laboratory. Experiments conducted with participants
from different cultures sometimes show differences (Roth et al. 1991; Herrmann et al. 2008), sometimes not
(Brandts et al. 2004; Cameron et al. 2005). Typically the differences are not large and would not lead to
radically different conclusions.
14 Subjects were informed about the number of rounds for reasons of transparency and practicality. This cre-
ates a deviation from the real situation which resembles an infinitely repeated game. Contrary to the real-life
decision makers, subjects could theoretically solve the 24-round supergame by backward induction and be
guided by this solution. However, since such behaviour is virtually never observed in any experiment (and
greatly at odds with the existing evidence from trust games), it seems unlikely to be the case in our setting.
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Table 2 Equilibria and Pareto optima of the game
Scenario Subgame perfect equilibria Pareto optima
Q = 10, no reservoirs (3,0) (6,2)
Q = 13, no reservoirs (4,0), (5,0), (6,0), (6,1) (7,2)
Q = 16, no reservoirs (4,0), (5,0), (6,0), (6,1),
(7,0), …, (7,2), (8,0), …, (8,3),
(9,0), …, (9,4)
(8,2), (8,3), (9,2), …, (9,4)
Q = 10, with reservoirs (3,0), (3,1) (4,2)
Q = 13, with reservoirs (4,0), …, (4,2), (5,0), …, (5,3), (6,0), …, (6,4) (7,2), …, (7,5)
Q = 16, with reservoirs (4,0), …, (4,2), (5,0), …, (5,3),
(6,0), …, (6,4), (7,0), …, (7,5),
(8,0), …, (8,6), (9,0), …, (9,7)
(8,2), …, (8,6), (9,2), …, (9,7)
16 in the treatment with Uzbek reservoirs. Without contracts the number of independent
observation is 16 without and 17 with reservoirs.
3.4 Game-Theoretic Considerations
Using the payoff tables shown in Appendix B, the subgame perfect equilibria (Selten 1965,
1975) of the stage game can easily be identified with a backward induction argument. It is
straightforward to see that in a noncooperative equilibrium no side payments are made. At
the last stage a side payment only reduces Kazakhstan’s payoff. Since the other players’
decisions are taken, Kazakhstan cannot gain anything from making a final payment. Analo-
gously, Uzbekistan does not gain from making a side payment to Kyrgyzstan, since Kyrgyz-
stan’s decision is already made.
The equilibrium choices with respect to water releases can be obtained from the payoff
tables. Since Kyrgyzstan foresees that it will not receive compensation payments, its payoff is
not affected by the choices being made downstream. Thus it will simply release the quantity
that maximises its own payoff.15 For example, in the benchmark case of Q = 13 without reser-
voirs, Kyrgyzstan can release anything from 4 to 6 units in an equilibrium and earn 370 talers
(see Table 11 in Appendix B). Uzbekistan then chooses the quantity to pass to Kazakhstan
given this behaviour. If Kyrgyzstan has chosen, for example, 6 units, then Uzbekistan passes
on 0 or 1 units to Kazakhstan.16 Thus, the combinations (qsky, quz)= (4, 0), (5, 0), (6, 0)
and (6,1), combined with no side payments, constitute subgame perfect equilibria of the
game. Table 2 illustrates the subgame perfect equilibria and Pareto optima for all six scenar-
ios.
The table shows that for the case of abundant water (Q = 16), there is no conflict between
own-payoff maximisation and cooperation, since the Pareto-optimal outcomes are also equi-
libria of the game. In normal or low water years, sustaining the Pareto-optimum requires
the players to deviate from the noncooperative equilibrium. The construction of the Uzbek
reservoir widens the range of equilibria and in some cases the range of Pareto optima as well.
15 This feature eases the game-theoretic analysis, as we do not require a full-fledged backward induction
analysis. However, a complete analysis is not difficult.
16 Note that passing on zero does not imply that the Syr Darya is dry at the Uzbek-Kazakh border. We
examine only the Naryn cascade, but as mentioned earlier, the river is also fed from other sources notably the
Kara Darya. Since other sources are generally unregulated, their inflow levels are not strategic variables in the
game and thus excluded.
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Interestingly, even after building the reservoirs there is still room for improvement through
cooperation. Still, in the case of low and normal water years the players can increase their
payoffs by agreeing on a non-equilibrium solution.
4 Results
In this section we present the results of the experimental data. Our main focus is the efficiency
implications of the new Uzbek reservoirs and the possibility of cooperation under the two
regimes. For readability we will continue to label the players with the names of the countries
they represent, though in fact they were experimental participants.
4.1 Kyrgyz Discharges from Toktogul
The economic efficiency of the outcome crucially relies on cooperation between Kyrgyzstan
and Uzbekistan. We therefore first examine the behaviour of the participants representing the
Kyrgyz side. Table 3 shows the relative frequency with which the different levels of Kyrgyz
water release occur in the experimental data.
In low water years we observe that the noncooperative choice is dominant in the data.
Recall that with Q = 10 (no reservoirs) the noncooperative release is 3 units and the Pareto-
optimal choice is 6 units. The choice generating the efficient solution is made in only 5% of
the cases, while in more than half of the years we observe the noncooperative release. Thus the
subjects representing Kyrgyzstan did not show much trust in their downstream counterparts.
This may be surprising given the high incidence of trustful choices in previous experiments
on reciprocity games. A possible explanation is the high risk that Kyrgyzstan must take when
deviating from the noncooperative (3 units) to the Pareto optimal choice (6 units). Under
Table 3 Relative frequency of Kyrgyz choices regarding Toktogul release
With contracts 
 natszygryK yb dessap ytitnauQ 
987654 3 tnemtaerT
Q=10, no reservoirs 0.562 0.298 0.083 0.050 0.008 0.000 0.000
Q=13, no reservoirs 0.050 0.142 0.083 0.383 0.333 0.008 0.000
Q=16, no reservoirs 0.017 0.075 0.050 0.117 0.008 0.258 0.475
Q=10, with reservoirs 0.586 0.188 0.164 0.023 0.023 0.016 0.000
Q=13, with reservoirs 0.023 0.102 0.039 0.500 0.234 0.094 0.008
Q=16, with reservoirs 0.047 0.102 0.031 0.078 0.055 0.305 0.383
Without contracts 
 natszygryK yb dessap ytitnauQ 
987654 3 tnemtaerT
Q=10, no reservoirs 0.633 0.283 0.067 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.008
Q=13, no reservoirs 0.039 0.164 0.125 0.516 0.156 0.000 0.000
Q=16, no reservoirs 0.031 0.156 0.055 0.156 0.086 0.148 0.367
Q=10, with reservoirs 0.603 0.301 0.088 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000
Q=13, with reservoirs 0.000 0.162 0.184 0.522 0.110 0.022 0.000
Q=16, with reservoirs 0.022 0.125 0.074 0.110 0.074 0.191 0.404
Note: Modal frequencies are set in bold face; Subgame perfect equilibria are underlined; Pareto optima
in grey
123
Sources of Mistrust 297
this scenario Kyrgyzstan renounces 477 talers (US$ 47.7m), and to gain maximum benefits
relies on receiving at least as much as a side payment from Uzbekistan. To make such a high
payment Uzbekistan would need to trust Kazakhstan to cooperate as well. Given that the total
benefit from cooperation (the pie that can be divided among the two players on top of the
noncooperative payoffs) is only 189 talers (US$ 18.9 m), it is quite plausible that the players
representing Kyrgyzstan in the laboratory deemed cooperation too risky.
Though the new reservoirs reduce Kyrgyzstan’s risk of cooperation considerably for
Q = 10 (the Pareto optimal release is then only 4 units and requires Kyrgyzstan to renounce
only 61 talers), the effect on the likelihood of cooperation is minor. While the frequency
of Pareto optimal releases increases significantly from 5.0 to 18.8% (α = 0.025 one-sided,
Fisher’s two-sample randomisation test) it is still low, and there is an absolute majority of
noncooperative choices. The effect is similar in the case without contracts, in which the fre-
quency of Pareto optimal choices increases from 0.8 to 30.1%. Thus even with the reduced
risk for Kyrgyzstan the structure of the game imposes substantial hurdles to cooperation
between the riparians.
In normal water years (Q = 13) the noncooperative choice is also most frequent, and we
even observe a substantial fraction of spiteful decisions (releases of 4 or 5 units, which yields
the maximum payoff for Kyrgyzstan but harm Uzbekistan). These may be acts of punishment
against the Uzbek player in response to default on side payments. Taking together the three
equilibrium options (4, 5 and 6 units) we observe noncooperative behaviour in more than 60%
of the cases (even more than 80% in the treatment without contracts). However, the prospect
for cooperation is not as bleak as in low-water years. Without reservoirs the Pareto optimal
release (7 units) is chosen frequently, especially in the treatment with contracts, where it is
realised in one third of the rounds (without contracts the frequency is substantially, but not
statistically significantly, lower). These results are independent of the new reservoirs, which
do not have a statistically significant effect on cooperation.
When water is abundant (Q = 16) participants usually do not find it difficult to implement
and sustain one of the efficient outcomes (a release of 8 or 9 units). However, note that in
high water years there is no conflict between individual payoff maximisation and efficiency,
such that this result does not hint at strong efforts to cooperate. In high-water years the new
reservoirs are practically obsolete, and consequently they do not have a significant effect on
the experimental results.17
4.2 Uzbek Compensation to Kyrgyzstan
In order for all three countries to benefit from cooperation Uzbekistan needs to compensate
Kyrgyzstan for its summer release of water. Table 4 shows Uzbekistan’s median side payment
to Kyrgyzstan, conditional on the quantity of water that Kyrgyzstan has released in summer. It
emerges that Uzbekistan’s reluctance to make sufficient payments is a source of cooperation
failure. This is particularly pronounced in low water years without reservoirs. Recall that
Kyrgyzstan renounces 477 talers ($47.7 m) when moving from the noncooperative equilib-
rium to the Pareto optimum. The experimental Kyrgyzstan players who did so received a
mere 25 talers ($2.5 m) back, in the median, as compensation in the treatment with con-
tracts.18 In the presence of Uzbek reservoirs Kyrgyzstan typically did not receive any reward
17 Note that the Uzbek reservoirs are too small to enable multi-year regulation, i.e. to benefit from storing
water inflows in high-water years and using it in low-water years.
18 In the treatment without contracts there was an insufficient number of observations to derive a meaningful
statistic. The pareto optimal Kyrgyz release was chosen only once.
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for releasing the efficient 4 units. This explains the low level of cooperation we observe
in low water years despite the fact that reservoirs make cooperation less risky. For Q = 13
Kyrgyzstan must forego 98 talers to sustain a Pareto optimal outcome (with and without
reservoirs), but the median Uzbek compensation payment generally falls short of this. Only
in the treatment with reservoirs and without contracts does the median compensation exceed
Kyrgyzstan’s foregone payoffs. In the other treatments the figure is between 45.5 and
92.5 talers. Interestingly the presence of contracts seems to worsen Uzbekistan’s willingness
to compensate Kyrgyzstan, but the data are too sparse to obtain statistical significance.
Finally, in high-water years we also observe some use of side payments. Although Ky-
rgyzstan receives the same payoff in the interval 4–9 units, its decision greatly affects Uzbe-
kistan. Therefore, Uzbekistan may choose to use side payments to reward Kyrgyzstan for
non-spitefulness thereby sustaining high releases.
4.3 Downstream Collaboration
The downstream riparians, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, rely on Kyrgyzstan’s behaviour in
order to achieve maximum payoffs. However, even without Kyrgyzstan’s good will they
often have room for improving their payoffs by cooperating. For each subgame (defined by
Kyrgyzstan’s release) we can identify a noncooperative equilibrium. In the payoff table this
is obtained where Uzbekistan’s payoff within one cell of equal releases from Kyrgyzstan
is highest. For example, suppose that in a normal water year without reservoirs Kyrgyzstan
has chosen to release 6 units. Uzbekistan’s payoff is then maximised if it passes either 0
or 1 units. Thus both choices constitute a noncooperative equilibrium for the subgame with
a Kyrgyz release of 6 units. The Pareto optimum can also be identified for each subgame
separately, and is characterised as the Uzbek choice that maximises the total payoff within
the cell. In the above example, Uzbekistan should pass 2 units.
















Q = 10, no reservoirs 0.050 0.075 0.717 0.158 1.000
Q = 13, no reservoirs 0.075 0.325 0.417 0.183 1.000
Q = 16, no reservoirs 0.034 0.184 0.683 0.100 1.001
Q = 10, with reservoirs 0.000 0.547 0.430 0.023 1.000
Q = 13, with reservoirs 0.000 0.500 0.492 0.008 1.000
Q = 16, with reservoirs 0.000 0.336 0.664 0.000 1.000
Without contracts
Q = 10, no reservoirs 0.016 0.094 0.789 0.102 1.001
Q = 13, no reservoirs 0.078 0.547 0.305 0.070 1.000
Q = 16, no reservoirs 0.063 0.289 0.578 0.070 1.000
Q = 10, with reservoirs 0.000 0.471 0.500 0.029 1.000
Q = 13, with reservoirs 0.000 0.500 0.471 0.029 1.000
Q = 16, with reservoirs 0.000 0.404 0.596 0.000 1.000
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Table 6 Frequency of




Q = 10, no reservoirs 0.308 0.865
Q = 13, no reservoirs 0.525 0.746
Q = 16, no reservoirs 0.625 0.587
Q = 10, with reservoirs 0.414 0.887
Q = 13, with reservoirs 0.508 0.785
Q = 16, with reservoirs 0.648 0.663
As illustrated in Table 5, Uzbekistan’s choice can fall into one of four categories depending
on whether it is a Pareto optimum and/or a noncooperative equilibrium or neither. The table
shows that efforts to cooperate between the downstream riparians have been modest. Pareto
optima are mainly chosen when they happen to be noncooperative equilibria as well. When
they are not equilibria they have only been implemented very few times. Noncooperative
equilibrium play is therefore the dominant outcome. In the treatment with reservoirs, virtu-
ally all of Uzbekistan’s decisions fall into that category. Since Pareto optima often coincide
with equilibrium choices in the subgames, this behaviour is not always inefficient. In at least
43% of cases the most efficient downstream solution was realised.
4.4 The Contracts and Their Adherence
In all six variants of the game (with contracts) participants find it difficult to come to an
agreement, and if they do these agreements are frequently broken (Table 6). When water is
scarce (Q = 10) an agreement is made in only about a third of the rounds, and from these
more than three-quarters are broken. The record is best when water is abundant and there is no
conflict between short-run self-interest and cooperation. Still, even in those years a majority
of contracts are not adhered to. In this case, however, the high rate of broken contracts may
just reflect that contracts are not considered necessary and are therefore taken less seriously.
Recall that in high water years there are a range of Pareto optimal choices. If the one imple-
mented is different from the one that has been agreed on this then does not necessarily have
negative consequences for the players.
As a consequence of the frequent failure of non-binding contracts, the effects of the con-
tracts themselves are very minor. As Tables 3, 4, 5 have indicated, the findings do not depend
on whether players sign a contract first before deciding how to share the resource. Players
are not more cooperative if they have the opportunity to make an agreement first. Though
contracts in this game are not binding, they could have served as a coordination device or as
an instrument to build up trust. However, it turns out that the contracts are not worth much
in this respect. They do not improve cooperation significantly and do therefore not lead to
more efficient outcomes, as the following analysis will show.
4.5 Efficiency
The total payoff gained by the three players jointly gives a measure of the efficiency of the
experimental outcomes. Figure 3 illustrates the median total payoff for the different treat-
ments as well as the efficiency loss, measured as the difference between the actual payoff
and potential payoff in the Pareto optimum. Efficiency losses are sizeable, particularly in low
and normal water years. Recall that the intercept terms of the payoff functions are unspeci-
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Fig. 3 Median total payoff (in US$ equivalents). Note: C = contracts, NC = No contracts, R = With reservoirs,
NR = Without reservoirs
fied. Thus, while payoffs of different treatments can be compared to each other, the absolute
payoff values are partly determined by our choice for the experimental payoff tables.
As expected, high-water years lead to higher payoffs—a finding which is significant for all
pairwise comparisons between two water levels in a given treatment (α < 0.0001, binomial
test). The positive impact of reservoirs, however, is limited to low-water years. In those years
reservoirs increase the median total payoff significantly (α < 0.0001, Fisher’s two-sample
randomisation test) and substantially by 161 talers (US$16.1 million equivalent).19 Precisely
the same figures are obtained for the treatment without contracts.20 The slight rise in payoff
from introducing reservoirs during normal water years is not significant. When water is abun-
dant we even observe a slight decrease in economic efficiency in the treatment with contracts
(no effect at all without), although this difference is statistically insignificant.
4.6 Dynamic and Individual Variation
The poor efficiency achieved in our experiment cannot be attributed to inexperience of sub-
jects in early rounds either. In the experiment, subjects played the river conflict game in 24
rounds, divided into three blocks of eight rounds, where the inflow level was varied across
the blocks. Figure 4 shows the development of efficiency during the course of play, again
measured as the total payoff of the three players. No systematic trend of efficiency varia-
tions over time is observed. The figure does reveal some individual sample variation, with
the exception of low water years where efficiency is stable in all treatments and cohorts.
Some groups of individuals exhibit a more erratic behaviour than others, although this is not
systematic across the four treatments of our experiment.21
19 This figure is higher than the theoretical value in Table 1. The difference stems mainly from the restrictive
assumption on water sharing that we drop in the experimental design. Further influences are the slightly higher
incidence of cooperative outcomes with reservoirs and the restriction to integer releases.
20 This is explained by the fact that the figure shows median values, not averages. For example, in the case
without reservoirs the bulk of observations involved Kyrgyzstan releasing 3 and Uzbekistan passing 0 units.
This was the behaviour in the median observation in both treatments and results in the same total payoff.
21 Each subject played with all three inflow levels, where we varied the sequence in which the three levels
followed one another. Within one treatment, the graphs in Fig. 4 with the circular markers (blue) depict values
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Fig. 4 Median total payoff over time
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Fig. 5 Median total payoff across groups
There was indeed some sampling variation across the between 15 and 17 independent
observations in each treatment. Figure 5 shows the median total payoff a group of three
experimental countries obtained over the eight rounds in which they played each inflow.
Variation is lowest with low inflow (Q = 10), where the noncooperative outcome is most pre-
dominant. For normal and high water settings variation is higher. Some triplets achieved some
degree of cooperation, others did not. Note that even though cooperation was relatively easy
in high water years, some groups of countries fall short of the achievable total payoff. Indi-
vidual variations like these dominate possible treatment effects, such that overall differences
between treatments cannot be detected.
Footnote 21 continued
for the same cohort of individuals. This is also the case for the lines with the quadratic (red) and triangular
(green) markers.
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5 Summary and Conclusions
We examined the likely impact of new Uzbek reservoirs on the Syr Darya economies. This
impact crucially depends on two issues. First, the reservoirs change the seasonal distribu-
tion of water availability in downstream Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan for any given release
by Kyrgyzstan. Thus, payoffs from Kyrgyz water releases to the three countries have to be
re-estimated. Secondly, the changed parameters may change the likelihood of regional coop-
eration. We designed a strategic game to address these issues. Costs and benefits of water
releases were computed using data from the region. We then set up a laboratory experiment
to examine the behavioural properties of the river sharing problem.
The theoretical analysis reveals that regional cooperation is still required for basinwide net
benefits to be maximised. In this sense the reservoirs do not achieve the goal of Uzbek self-
sufficiency. The experimental results strongly suggest that failure to cooperate is systematic.
Inefficient noncooperative outcomes prevail in our experiments, in line with past behaviour
in the river conflict, but in contrast to most trust games reported in the experimental literature.
Experimental participants fail to set up mutually beneficial agreements (particularly in low-
water years) and if agreements are made they are frequently broken. Thus our results suggest
that failure to implement cooperative agreements should not be attributed to current decision
makers’ unwillingness alone. Cooperation failure is inherent to the structural features of the
river conflict. Thus our results leave us pessimistic about decision makers being able to play
the game more cooperatively in the future. Rather, they suggest changing the structure of
the game, notably the sequence of water release and compensation that appears to make
cooperation so difficult. While there are physical limits to synchronising water release and
compensation in a barter scheme (due to prohibitive storage costs of energy and fuel), instal-
ment schemes using money payments may help to reduce the risks to trustful behaviour.22
Once these mechanisms are developed, new experiments can be designed to test their likely
effectiveness.
The enhanced basinwide efficiency effect of the new reservoirs originates mainly from
Uzbekistan’s reduced dependency on Kyrgyz summer releases, and is limited to low-water
years. A possible effect of enhanced cooperation can be detected statistically, but it is rela-
tively small. As an overall effect of the new reservoirs we observe a median efficiency gain
of the equivalent of an annual US$ 16.1 million for the low-water years, and no significant
effect for normal and high-water years. Though this figure can naturally not be precise, it may
provide an order of magnitude for a cost-benefit analysis of constructing the reservoirs. The
benefits need to be weighed against the high construction costs. For these no official Uzbek
figures are available, but they are estimated in the order of several hundred million dollars.
Of course, our findings have their limits. Though we have made every effort to trace the
real economic framework as accurately as possible, no economic model (experimental or
theoretical) can guarantee that no salient features of the real situation are lost or distorted
when simplifying the economic environment. Undeniably the laboratory environment adds
some artificiality as well. Despite these caveats we believe that the experimental methodol-
ogy widens the scope for economic case studies, when behavioural influences are known to
be relevant but natural data are unavailable.
Further, for the first experimental study on the Syr Darya river conflict we had to restrict
the analysis to a few representative scenarios. Many future developments are uncertain today.
In the long run, population growth, economic development, or world market conditions for
22 In this sense, our data call for a further development of a ‘letter of credit’ scheme like the one suggested
in World Bank (2004a).
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cotton may alter the parameters of the game. There are also worries that the glaciers and
snowfields that feed the Syr Darya will shrink because of climate change. As a consequence,
inflow would rise in the short run (because the melting water is added to the natural inflow),
but fall in the long run (as glaciers are depleted).23 This increased scarcity of water could
reinforce the conflict in the future.
The relevant long-term future scenarios are also affected by strategic decisions outside
our economic analysis. If construction plans for the Kambarata I and II hydropower plants
in the Kyrgyz mountains are eventually realised an entirely different situation would arise.
Kyrgyzstan would be able to generate an electricity surplus in winter, and use the Toktogul
reservoir to re-regulate the Naryn river flow towards an irrigation mode. The Kambarata
hydropower stations, however, are projects of a magnitude that Kyrgyzstan cannot shoulder
on its own (estimates are in excess of US$ 2bn), and existing cost-effectiveness analyses
question their economic viability. Nevertheless, both Russia and Kazakhstan have shown an
interest in co-financing the projects (possibly to gain political influence in the region) and
further research is needed should these plans materialise.
While the set-up of the present experiment has been tailored to the Syr Darya river conflict,
the methodology introduced is applicable to many other transboundary river conflicts as well.
The other great Central Asian river, the Amu Darya, has characteristics that could turn the
river into exactly the same problem as the Syr Darya, if upstream Tajikistan proceeds with
plans to expand its hydropower capacity. In light of the Syr Darya experience, downstream
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are seriously concerned that the conflict there may be repli-
cated. On the river Nile there is potential for conflict if upstream Ethiopia decides to develop
its substantial hydropower potential thus disrupting the growing season in Egypt. Namibian
plans for the Popa Falls hydropower plant on the Okavango river potentially affect wildlife-
oriented tourism in Botswana’s national parks in the downstream Okavango delta. All these
examples share a potential conflict between hydropower in an upstream country and other
economic interests in another downstream country. In future it is likely that more conflicts
will emerge since only 10% of the world’s hydropower potential is currently being exploited
(Khagram 2004). This source of energy can therefore be expected to play a much greater role
than today, and management of the resulting water conflicts becomes an even more vital issue.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommer-
cial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided
the original author(s) and source are credited.
Appendix A. Estimation of the Payoff Functions
A.1. Kyrgyzstan
Electricity output in the summer season, Ys MWh, is given by the hydropower production
function:
Ys = αqsky (1)
where α > 0 is a productivity parameter and qsky BCM is the Kyrgyz water release from the
Toktogul Reservoir in the summer season. Kyrgyzstan must cover a domestic energy demand
23 According to current estimates the volume of glaciers on the territory of Kyrgyzstan will reduce signifi-
cantly over the next quarter of a century resulting in a considerable reduction of water in the region’s rivers
(see for example IPPC 2001).
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of Es MWh in summer. Due to technical losses, the necessary gross power generation nec-
essary is given by Es/νs MWh, where νs ∈ [0; 1] is an efficiency parameter. The Kyrgyz
domestic energy deficit in the summer season, Ds MWh, is defined as follows:
Ds = Es/νs − αqsky (2)
To cover this deficit Kyrgyzstan operates its thermal power plant, Bishkek I, fuelled by
imported natural gas and coal. Bishkek I has a short-run marginal cost of CI US$/kwh and
an operating capacity of K MWh. If the domestic energy deficit is larger than the capacity of
Bishkek I, a second thermal power plant, Bishkek II, is operated. It has a short-run marginal
cost of CII > CI and an assumed unlimited capacity within the relevant range of the model.
Conversely, in the case of a domestic energy surplus, Kyrgyz electricity is exported to Uzbe-
kistan and Kazakhstan. Electricity payments are not modelled explicitly, but may implicitly
constitute a part of the side payments between countries. The Kyrgyz gross payoff during
summer (excluding side payments), measured in million US$, is given as follows:




for Ds ≤ K (3a)
π sky = −CIK − CII
(
Ds − K) for Ds > K. (3b)
In winter, hydropower is produced using the same constant-returns-to-scale technology
as expressed in (1). Denoting all seasonal variables by superscript w, the Kyrgyz domestic
energy deficit in winter is given by:
Dw = Ew/νw − α qwky (4)
A domestic energy deficit is covered by the Bishkek I and II thermal power plants in the
same manner as in the summer period. In case of a domestic energy surplus, Kyrgyzstan is






for Dw ≤ K (5a)
πwky = −CIK − CII
(
Dw − K) for Dw > K (5b)
Denoting the side payment received by Kyrgyzstan from Uzbekistan for its water and
electricity services by Sky the Kyrgyz total payoff (in million US$) is24:
πky = Iky + π sky + πwky + Sky (6)
The intercept of the payoff function, Iky, is not specified and can be chosen arbitrarily,
since our economic analysis only aims at comparing payoffs in different scenarios. If it is
omitted, then a zero Kyrgyz payoff corresponds to a situation in which the domestic energy
deficit is non-negative in both seasons.
A.2. Uzbekistan
Uzbek payoff relates only to the summer period and can be divided into two components:
irrigation and electricity. Uzbek irrigation supply for cotton production is available from
two main sources: summer water released by Kyrgyzstan, qsky, and water available in the new
24 In the model, Kazakhstan does not issue a side payment directly to Kyrgyzstan (as it does in reality), but
rather to Uzbekistan. This is done to ensure that Uzbekistan has an incentive to release water to Kazakhstan.
In reality, the Uzbek incentive to release water to Kazakhstan is mainly political, i.e. Uzbekistan does not want
to upset international relations with its downstream neighbour.
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Uzbek reservoirs, R, which are filled in the winter period where R < qwky. Uzbekistan releases
some of this water to Kazakhstan, quz ≤ qsky + R, and withdraws the residual, qsky + R − quz,
for cotton production. Of its total water withdrawals, only a share 0 ≤ βuz ≤ 1 is used for
cotton irrigation with the residual (1 − βuz) used for other crops, the production of which
is assumed non-profitable. The economic value of irrigation water for cotton production is
P US$/KCM. While we have not explicitly modelled an agricultural production function,
it would be unrealistic to expect that marginal benefits are always positive, especially for
high levels of water input. It is therefore assumed that if irrigation input reaches an optimum
point, Ouz, then the marginal value of irrigation water is zero.25 Uzbek gross irrigation benefits








We now turn to the Uzbek electricity benefits. Suppose that Kyrgyzstan runs a domestic
energy surplus in summer and that a share of this surplus is exported to Uzbekistan. In this
case Uzbekistan can import electricity at a lower cost than were it to produce this electric-
ity domestically. The gross benefit of electricity imports is valued at the opportunity cost
of operating a coal fired power plant in Uzbekistan, the short-run marginal cost of which
is Cuz US$/kwh. After accounting for the technical loss of transmitting electricity through
the Uzbek power grid, electricity available for import equals -ρ Ds, where 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 is
an efficiency parameter. Due to technical constraints in the transmission grid, electricity
exports cannot exceed X MWh. The exported electricity is shared between Uzbekistan and




{−Ds, X} , 0} (8)
Denoting the side payment from Kazakhstan to Uzbekistan, Suz we can write the Uzbek
payoff as follows:






+ MAX {Cuz γ ρMIN
{−Ds, X} , 0}
+ Suz − Sky (9)
As with the Kyrgyz payoff function the intercept does not have any meaningful inter-
pretation. If intercept and side payments are omitted and R = 0 then a zero payoff would
correspond to a situation in which Kyrgyzstan releases no water at all in summer.
A.3. Kazakhstan
Like Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan also benefits from irrigation and electricity in the summer
period. The Kazakh payoff-function is similar to that of Uzbekistan and is given by the
following expression (where Kazakh variables are denoted with subscript ka)
πka = Ika + PβkaMIN
{
quz, Oka
} + MAX {Cka (1 − γ) ρMIN
{−Ds, X} , 0} − Suz (10)
where Ika is the unspecified intercept of the Kazakh payoff function.
25 Clearly this represents a substantial simplification of a more realistic cotton production function with
diminishing returns to scale (and possibly a negative marginal product). The practical significance of this for
the experimental results, however, seems negligible.
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Table 7 Historical flow data (BCM), Toktogul Reservoir, 1988–2003
Year Total Summer Winter
Inflow Outflow Inflow Outflow Inflow Outflow
1988 16.52 12.24 13.46 8.80 3.06 3.44
1989 10.13 14.97 7.34 10.97 2.79 4.00
1990 12.99 11.60 10.25 7.09 2.74 4.51
1991 10.74 13.16 7.93 8.51 2.81 4.65
1992 12.05 12.19 9.05 6.55 3.00 5.64
1993 13.64 10.59 10.61 4.41 3.03 6.18
1994 15.24 14.52 12.08 6.72 3.16 7.80
1995 10.89 14.62 7.88 6.33 3.01 8.29
1996 13.70 14.53 10.94 6.16 2.76 8.37
1997 10.83 13.68 8.09 6.08 2.74 7.60
1998 14.49 11.16 11.50 3.68 2.99 7.48
1999 14.47 13.47 11.01 5.07 3.46 8.40
2000 12.62 15.18 9.19 6.48 3.43 8.70
2001 12.56 15.15 9.29 5.91 3.27 9.24
2002 16.67 11.38 13.51 3.65 3.16 7.73
2003 15.67 14.16 12.00 4.90 3.67 9.26
Average 13.33 13.29 10.26 6.33 3.07 6.96
Percentage (%) 100 100 77.0 47.7 23.0 52.3
Minimum 10.13 10.59 7.34 3.65 2.74 3.44
Maximum 16.67 15.18 13.51 10.97 3.67 9.26
Standard deviation 2.09 1.56 1.96 1.91 0.28 1.94
Source: Primary data provided by JSC Kyrgyzenergo, Bishkek
A.4. The Underlying Data
Having defined the payoff functions of the three riparians the next step is to use real data to
estimate the model. Analytically, this procedure is straightforward since it simply involves
the use of numerical values for all exogenous variables and parameters. In practical terms,
however, the compilation and selection of relevant data constituted a significant challenge.
Water availability is a key determinant of riparian payoff. We use primary data collected
by JSC Kyrgyzenergo for the 1988–2003 period (see Table 7). Water inflow is a stochastic
variable determined by nature while water outflow is a reflection of political decisions made
by Kyrgyzstan. The presence of what is, in effect, two stochastic variables (summer and win-
ter inflows) adds complications to the experimental design. We thus make the simplifying
assumption that Kyrgyz winter release is residually determined, qwky = Q − qsky where Q
denotes annual inflow.26 This is equivalent to assuming that annual inflow equals annual out-
flow. While this is true in the medium to long term it is a restrictive assumption on an annual
basis. Thus while in practice the Toktogul Reservoir is large enough to enable multi-annual
regulation, our analysis focuses exclusively on the seasonal conflict.
26 Ambec and Doucet (2003) and Moller (2005a, b) make similar assumptions.
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Table 8 Assumed values of exogenous variables and parameters
Name Description Unit Value Source
α Hydropower efficiency m3/kWh 0.86 Antipova et al. (2002)
Es Net energy demand, summer GWh 2,550 World Bank (2004a)
Ew Net energy demand, winter GWh 4,950 World Bank (2004a)
νs Technical transmission efficiency, summer percent 90.0 World Bank (2004a)
νw Technical transmission efficiency, winter percent 85.0 World Bank (2004a)
K Generation capacity, Bishkek I GWh 876 World Bank (2004a)
CI Short-run marginal cost, Bishkek I US$/kWh 0.0150 World Bank (2004a)
CII Short-run marginal cost, Bishkek II US$/kWh 0.0255 World Bank (2004b)
Cuz Short-run marginal cost, Uzbekistan US$/kWh 0.0230 World Bank (2004a)
Cka Short-run marginal cost, Kazakhstan US$/kWh 0.0210 World Bank (2004a)
ρ Technical transmission efficiency, exports percent 94.0 World Bank (2004a)
γ Share of electricity exported to Uzbekistan percent 50.0 World Bank (2004a)
X Maximum hydropower export volume GWh 4,000 Peter Graham (personal
communication, 2005)a
P Economic value of irrigation water US$/KCM 20 World Bank (2004a)
Ouz Optimal irrigation input for Uzbekistan BCM 4.5 World Bank (2004a),
Antipova et al. (2002)
Oka Optimal irrigation input for Kazakhstan BCM 2.0 World Bank (2004a),
Antipova et al. (2002)
a Peter Graham, Tariff Policy & Utility Reform Project, DFID Bishkek (personal communication, 9 February
2005)
Table 8 summarises the assumed values of the remaining exogenous variables and param-
eters a few of which deserve special mention: First, we have set the economic value of
irrigation water at US$ 20/KCM (1,000 cm3). According to the World Bank (2004a), the
value of irrigation in Central Asia is estimated as being in the region of $20–$50 per KCM.
To produce conservative benefit estimates we choose the lower range of this estimate. Sec-
ondly, optimal irrigation input has been calculated on the basis of total land under cotton
in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, including additional land introduced in the medium term.
Our results are consistent with those provided by Antipova et al. (2002) who estimate a total
downstream irrigation need of 6.5 BCM. Thirdly, to capture the effect of increased marginal
cost of thermal power production beyond the capacity of Bishkek I, we used cost figures
for Bishkek II. The Bishkek II plant, however, currently exists only at the design stage and
although it could be completed within a few years the Kyrgyz government is yet to approve
its construction.27
Appendix B. The Payoff Tables
See Tables 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14.
27 The Kyrgyz government hesitates to do so because the plant relies on imported natural gas from Uzbekistan.
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3 0 333 12 83 428
3 1 333 −58 139 414
3 2 333 −128 195 400
3 3 333 −198 195 330
4 0 272 148 144 564
4 1 272 78 200 55
4 2 272 8 256 536
4 3 272 −62 256 466
4 4 272 −132 256 396
5 0 76 277 229 582
5 1 76 242 285 603
5 2 76 172 341 589
5 3 76 102 341 519
5 4 76 32 341 449
5 5 76 −38 341 379
6 0 −144 370 314 540
6 1 −144 370 370 596
6 2 −144 335 426 617
6 3 −144 265 426 547
6 4 −144 195 426 477
6 5 −144 125 426 407
6 6 −144 55 426 337
7 0 −364 463 399 498
7 1 −364 463 455 554
7 2 −364 463 511 610
7 3 −364 428 511 575
7 4 −364 358 511 505
7 5 −364 288 511 435
7 6 −364 218 511 365
7 7 −364 148 511 295
8 0 −583 549 478 444
8 1 −583 549 534 500
8 2 −583 549 590 556
8 3 −583 549 590 556
8 4 −583 514 590 521
8 5 −583 444 590 451
8 6 −583 374 590 381
8 7 −583 304 590 311
8 8 −583 234 590 241
9 0 −803 549 478 224
9 1 −803 549 534 280
9 2 −803 549 590 336
9 3 −803 549 590 336
9 4 −803 549 590 336
9 5 −803 514 590 301
9 6 −803 444 590 231
9 7 −803 374 590 161
9 8 −803 304 590 91
9 9 −803 234 590 21
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3 0 333 117 83 533
3 1 333 117 139 589
3 2 333 47 195 575
3 3 333 −23 195 505
4 0 272 183 144 599
4 1 272 183 200 655
4 2 272 183 256 711
4 3 272 113 256 641
4 4 272 43 256 571
5 0 76 277 229 582
5 1 76 277 285 638
5 2 76 277 341 694
5 3 76 277 341 694
5 4 76 207 341 624
5 5 76 137 341 554
6 0 −144 370 314 540
6 1 −144 370 370 596
6 2 −144 370 426 652
6 3 −144 370 426 652
6 4 −144 370 426 652
6 5 −144 300 426 582
6 6 −144 230 426 512
7 0 −364 463 399 498
7 1 −364 463 455 554
7 2 −364 463 511 610
7 3 −364 463 511 610
7 4 −364 463 511 610
7 5 −364 463 511 610
7 6 −364 393 511 540
7 7 −364 323 511 470
8 0 −583 549 478 444
8 1 −583 549 534 500
8 2 −583 549 590 556
8 3 −583 549 590 556
8 4 −583 549 590 556
8 5 −583 549 590 556
8 6 −583 549 590 556
8 7 −583 479 590 486
8 8 −583 409 590 416
9 0 −803 549 478 224
9 1 −803 549 534 280
9 2 −803 549 590 336
9 3 −803 549 590 336
9 4 −803 549 590 336
9 5 −803 549 590 336
9 6 −803 549 590 336
9 7 −803 549 590 336
9 8 −803 479 590 266
9 9 −803 409 590 196
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3 0 333 12 83 428
3 1 333 −58 139 414
3 2 333 −128 195 400
3 3 333 −198 195 330
4 0 370 148 144 662
4 1 370 78 200 648
4 2 370 8 256 634
4 3 370 −62 256 564
4 4 370 −132 256 494
5 0 370 277 229 876
5 1 370 242 285 897
5 2 370 172 341 883
5 3 370 102 341 813
5 4 370 32 341 743
5 5 370 −38 341 673
6 0 370 370 314 1,054
6 1 370 370 370 1,110
6 2 370 335 426 1,131
6 3 370 265 426 1,061
6 4 370 195 426 991
6 5 370 125 426 921
6 6 370 55 426 851
7 0 272 463 399 1,134
7 1 272 463 455 1,190
7 2 272 463 511 1,246
7 3 272 428 511 1,211
7 4 272 358 511 1,141
7 5 272 288 511 1,071
7 6 272 218 511 1,001
7 7 272 148 511 931
8 0 76 549 478 1,103
8 1 76 549 534 1,159
8 2 76 549 590 1,215
8 3 76 549 590 1,215
8 4 76 514 590 1,180
8 5 76 444 590 1,110
8 6 76 374 590 1,040
8 7 76 304 590 970
8 8 76 234 590 900
9 0 −144 549 478 883
9 1 −144 549 534 939
9 2 −144 549 590 995
9 3 −144 549 590 995
9 4 −144 549 590 995
9 5 −144 514 590 960
9 6 −144 444 590 890
9 7 −144 374 590 820
9 8 −144 304 590 750
9 9 −144 234 590 680
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3 0 333 117 83 533
3 1 333 117 139 589
3 2 333 47 195 575
3 3 333 −23 195 505
4 0 370 183 144 697
4 1 370 183 200 753
4 2 370 183 256 809
4 3 370 113 256 739
4 4 370 43 256 669
5 0 370 277 229 876
5 1 370 277 285 932
5 2 370 277 341 988
5 3 370 277 341 988
5 4 370 207 341 918
5 5 370 137 341 848
6 0 370 370 314 1,054
6 1 370 370 370 1,110
6 2 370 370 426 1,166
6 3 370 370 426 1,166
6 4 370 370 426 1,166
6 5 370 300 426 1,096
6 6 370 230 426 1,026
7 0 272 463 399 1,134
7 1 272 463 455 1,190
7 2 272 463 511 1,246
7 3 272 463 511 1,246
7 4 272 463 511 1,246
7 5 272 463 511 1,246
7 6 272 393 511 1,176
7 7 272 323 511 1,106
8 0 76 549 478 1,103
8 1 76 549 534 1,159
8 2 76 549 590 1,215
8 3 76 549 590 1,215
8 4 76 549 590 1,215
8 5 76 549 590 1,215
8 6 76 549 590 1,215
8 7 76 479 590 1,145
8 8 76 409 590 1,075
9 0 −144 549 478 883
9 1 −144 549 534 939
9 2 −144 549 590 995
9 3 −144 549 590 995
9 4 −144 549 590 995
9 5 −144 549 590 995
9 6 −144 549 590 995
9 7 −144 549 590 995
9 8 −144 479 590 925
9 9 −144 409 590 855
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3 0 333 12 83 428
3 1 333 −58 139 414
3 2 333 −128 195 400
3 3 333 −198 195 330
4 0 370 148 144 662
4 1 370 78 200 648
4 2 370 8 256 634
4 3 370 −62 256 564
4 4 370 −132 256 494
5 0 370 277 229 876
5 1 370 242 285 897
5 2 370 172 341 883
5 3 370 102 341 813
5 4 370 32 341 743
5 5 370 −38 341 673
6 0 370 370 314 1,054
6 1 370 370 370 1,110
6 2 370 335 426 1,131
6 3 370 265 426 1,061
6 4 370 195 426 991
6 5 370 125 426 921
6 6 370 55 426 851
7 0 370 463 399 1,232
7 1 370 463 455 1,288
7 2 370 463 511 1,344
7 3 370 428 511 1,309
7 4 370 358 511 1,239
7 5 370 288 511 1,169
7 6 370 218 511 1,099
7 7 370 148 511 1, 029
8 0 370 549 478 1, 397
8 1 370 549 534 1, 453
8 2 370 549 590 1, 509
8 3 370 549 590 1, 509
8 4 370 514 590 1, 474
8 5 370 444 590 1, 404
8 6 370 374 590 1, 334
8 7 370 304 590 1, 264
8 8 370 234 590 1, 194
9 0 370 549 478 1, 397
9 1 370 549 534 1, 453
9 2 370 549 590 1, 509
9 3 370 549 590 1, 509
9 4 370 549 590 1, 509
9 5 370 514 590 1, 474
9 6 370 444 590 1, 404
9 7 370 374 590 1, 334
9 8 370 304 590 1, 264
9 9 370 234 590 1, 194
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3 0 333 117 83 533
3 1 333 117 139 589
3 2 333 47 195 575
3 3 333 −23 195 505
4 0 370 183 144 697
4 1 370 183 200 753
4 2 370 183 256 809
4 3 370 113 256 739
4 4 370 43 256 669
5 0 370 277 229 876
5 1 370 277 285 932
5 2 370 277 341 988
5 3 370 277 341 988
5 4 370 207 341 918
5 5 370 137 341 848
6 0 370 370 314 1,054
6 1 370 370 370 1, 110
6 2 370 370 426 1, 166
6 3 370 370 426 1, 166
6 4 370 370 426 1, 166
6 5 370 300 426 1, 096
6 6 370 230 426 1, 026
7 0 370 463 399 1, 232
7 1 370 463 455 1, 288
7 2 370 463 511 1, 344
7 3 370 463 511 1, 344
7 4 370 463 511 1, 344
7 5 370 463 511 1, 344
7 6 370 393 511 1, 274
7 7 370 323 511 1, 204
8 0 370 549 478 1, 397
8 1 370 549 534 1, 453
8 2 370 549 590 1, 509
8 3 370 549 590 1, 509
8 4 370 549 590 1, 509
8 5 370 549 590 1, 509
8 6 370 549 590 1, 509
8 7 370 479 590 1, 439
8 8 370 409 590 1, 369
9 0 370 549 478 1, 397
9 1 370 549 534 1, 45
9 2 370 549 590 1, 509
9 3 370 549 590 1, 509
9 4 370 549 590 1, 509
9 5 370 549 590 1, 509
9 6 370 549 590 1, 509
9 7 370 549 590 1, 509
9 8 370 479 590 1, 439
9 9 370 409 590 1, 369
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Appendix C: Instructions for the Experiment
General Information
We thank you for coming to the experiment. The purpose of this session is to study how
people make decisions in a particular situation. During the session it is not permitted to talk
or communicate with other participants. If you have a question, please raise your hand and
the facilitator will come to your desk to answer it. During the session you will earn money.
At the end of the session the amount you have earned will be paid to you in cash. Payments
are confidential. We will not inform any of the other participants about the amount you have
earned. In the following, all amounts of money are denominated in talers, the experimental
currency unit.
The participants in this session are divided into groups of three participants. These groups
play completely independently. The composition of the groups remains the same throughout
the experiment. You do not know which of the other participants are in your group.
There are three types of players in this game: player 1, player 2, and player 3. Participants
play the same role throughout the experiment.
The experiment consists of 24 rounds with the same decision situation. Each round is
structured as explained below.
Payoff Structure
In each round the three players must divide a resource. At the end of each round the players
receive a payoff depending on how the resource has been divided. The division of the resource
takes place as follows:
Player 1 receives a quantity of the resource. Player 1 can then pass on some quantity of
the resource to player 2. After player 2 has received a share of the resource, he or she can
pass on some quantity of this share to player 3.
Player 1’s payoff from the resource depends on two factors: (1) how much of the resource
is available, and (2) how much of the resource is passed on to player 2.
Player 2’s payoff depends on the quantity of the resource received from player 1 minus
the quantity passed on to player 3.
Player 3’s payoff depends on the quantity of the resource received from player 2.
The payoff of the three players is listed in the enclosed table.
The three player’s payoff also depends on the payments they make to each other in ex-
change for the resources received. This is explained in more detail below.
The Decision Situation
Each of the 24 rounds consists of two stages. The first stage is the negotiation stage. The
second stage is the implementation stage.
The Negotiation Stage
In the negotiation stage the players can make a non-binding agreement over (1) the division
of the resource, and (2) payments they make between each other. This is done in the following
steps:
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Step 1: One of the three players is selected to be the proposer. This selection is random and
each player is selected to be the proposer with probability one third.
Step 2: The selected player makes a proposal which specifies the following aspects:
• How many units of the resource player 1 passes on to player 2. All integer
numbers between three and nine are feasible.
• How many units of the resource player 2 passes on to player 3. Feasible are all
integer numbers between zero and the maximum possible (i.e. the number of
units passed from player 1 to player 2).
• How many talers player 2 pays to player 1. All integer numbers from 0 to 1,000
are feasible.
• How many talers player 3 pays to player 2. All integer numbers from 0 to 1,000
are feasible.
Step 3: Each of the two other players (apart from the proposer) decides whether to accept
or reject the proposal.
Note that an agreement made in the negotiation stage is not binding. It does not commit
the players to act in any particular way at the implementation stage.
The Implementation Stage
In the implementation stage the division of the resource as well as payments between players
are implemented. This is done in the following steps:
Step 4: Player 1 decides how many units of the resource to pass on to player 2. This number
must be between three and nine (both inclusive).
Step 5: Player 2 decides how many units of the resource to pass on to player 3. Feasible are
all integer numbers between zero and the total amount of units received from player
1.
Step 6: Player 2 decides how many talers to pay player 1. All integer numbers from 0 to
1,000 are feasible.
Step 7: Player 3 decides how many talers to pay player 2. All integer numbers from 0 to
1,000 are feasible.
Phases
The experiment is divided into of three phases, each consisting of eight rounds. Each round
is played exactly the same way as described above. The rounds differ in the quantity of the
resource that is available.
The players’ payoffs vary with the available quantity of the resource. Therefore a different
payoff table is used for each phase. At the outset of a new phase you will be given the relevant
payoff table. Please note that the payoff table lists the payoffs of the players excluding the
payments made between them.
Payoffs
You start with an initial capital of 1,000 talers. Your payoff from each round will be added
to this amount. At the end of the session the talers are converted into Pound Sterling at an
exchange rate of £2.50 per 1,000 talers. The minimum payoff is £3.
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